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One does not have to go very far into the subject of artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) before deep philosophical issues start to surface. The
Turing test, the frame problem, the Chinese room argument, symbol grounding, the role of representation: these are just a few of the
topics that have generated intense discussion and debate over the years. One particular controversy surrounds symbolism: whether or
not it is necessary to have explicit symbol representation and, if so, the mechanism(s) by which these symbols came into existence.
How are such questions to be answered? Generally, they are considered to lie in the realm of philosophy and not to be easily amenable
to experimental test. However, when even limited experimental test is feasible, it can oﬀer valuable insight. In this paper, we present
an empirical test designed to explore some important foundational issues in AI. An artiﬁcial agent inhabits a digital world (a cellular
automaton) in which its cognitive abilities vary in three dimensions (size of symbol memory, percentage of symbols that are innate,
planning depth), allowing us to position it in a space that reﬂects degree of commitment to key philosophical standpoints. One plane of
this space corresponds to pure symbol attachment, another plane corresponds to pure symbol grounding, and the origin of coordinates
corresponds to pure enactivism. We ﬁnd that an enactivist (purely reactive) agent architecture can perform as well as one employing
planning in this scenario, if properly designed. Planning has strengths when task/environment complexity make design diﬃcult but
weaknesses if an inappropriate world model is acquired (e.g. as a result of mismatch between model and task/environment complexity).
However, the main claim of the paper is that empirical exploration of the kind presented here could usefully form the initial phase
of the design of many practical AI systems, and forms a valuable alternative to simply declaring a priori adherence to a particular
philosophical position.
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1 Introduction
Throughout the 50–60 year history of artiﬁcial intelligence (AI), the majority view of its adherents has
held that cognition can be replicated on a universal Turing machine (Turing, 1936) or equivalent; all that
remains is to ﬁnd the correct ‘algorithm of thought’. And as we move towards this goal, so we will uncover a
host of beneﬁts, not only the ability to automate increasingly complex and useful tasks previously restricted
to the exercise of human ‘intelligence’, but also gaining insights into the nature of the mind. Although
there have already been some notable successes, profound disagreement remains among researchers over
how to reach AI’s ultimate goal. Indeed, some consider the entire endeavour to be ultimately futile (cf.
Searle 1980).
For the continued health of AI as a discipline, further practical successes are mandatory. But much
as the AI practitioner or technician might wish to sidestep or ignore philosophical concerns, this is not
really an option. Philosophical issues are never far below the surface in AI (Boden, 1990; Copeland, 1993)
so that every practical approach adopted implies commitment to some standpoint. Hence, practitioners
would beneﬁt from an eﬀective way to untangle the philosophical debate, and reach a clearer view of
the way forward. Currently, the debate centres essentially around thought experiments, but these have
their obvious diﬃculties (H¨ aggqvist, 1996; Gendler, 2000; Peijnenburg and Atkinson, 2003; Souder, 2003;
Damper, 2006). We believe that thought experiment alone is inadequate to reach deﬁnitive conclusions
and, diﬃcult as it might be, empirical data bearing on the controversy need to be collected. At present,
the number of attempts to test empirically philosophical issues in AI is vanishingly small. In this regard,
one might mention the experiments of Kaernbach (2005) aimed at discovering what experimental subjects
in a ‘Chinese room’ do and do not come to understand about their formally-speciﬁed task, but there are
precious few other examples. The present paper aims to add to this tiny literature. We readily concede that
this approach has its own problems; to keep the empirical work focused and tractable, simpliﬁcations and
constraints need to be introduced, and these may have unavoidable bearing on the philosophical points at
issue. It is, therefore, necessary to keep this in mind in interpreting the outcomes.
Speciﬁcally, we focus on one particular and important division of opinion in AI; namely the tensionJune 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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between symbolism and enactivism. We then attempt an experimental test of the success of an artiﬁcial
agent to maintain a self-sustaining density in a simple digital world as its cognitive abilities are manipulated
to reﬂect commitment to the tenets of three diﬀerent philosophical standpoints, namely:
(i) symbolism based on ‘symbol grounding’;
(ii) symbolism based on ‘symbol attachment’;
(iii) non-symbolic ‘enactivism’.
In the following section, we outline the basic ideas of these three diﬀerent philosophies. Thereafter,
in Section 3 the general design methodology employed in the empirical comparison of these diﬀerent
philosophies is described. Section 4 details our speciﬁc experimental design and the results obtained.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Symbolism and enactivism
At present, the AI community is divided such that we can identify a number of philosophical approaches.
Many researchers begin from the assumption that cognition arises through the rule-based manipulation
and combination of symbolic tokens (e.g. Newell, 1973; Minsky, 1974; Fodor, 1975; Newell and Simon,
1976; Newell, 1980, 1990; Pylyshyn, 1984; Dietrich, 1990). In one school of thought, the atomic symbols are
formed through the perception of and interaction with the surrounding environment so as to give meaning
to the symbols and their combinations. But this view faces a formidable problem, famously articulated by
Harnad (1990) as: ‘How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be made intrinsic to
the system, rather than just parasitic on the meanings in our heads?’ (p.335). Harnad characterises this
problem as symbol grounding. For AI systems to achieve meaningful ‘intelligence’, this question needs to
be addressed. In light of its importance, various solution have been proposed—see Belpaeme et al. (2007)
for some recent work.
Many agree with the symbolic perspective but contend that certain innate concepts need to be present at
birth. For example, internal representations of space and time are required to make sense of the surroundingJune 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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environment. These innate concepts are ‘attached’ to the world through experience; they are not formed.
Accordingly, Sloman and Chappell (2004) identify this school of thought as symbol attachment. Despite
the necessity for innate concepts in virtually all (or perhaps literally all) practical AI systems, in that the
system designer has to implant some speciﬁcation or driver of desired behaviour, symbol attachment faces
the charge of ignoring the challenge of ‘parasitic meaning’. Biological systems derive innate information
from the genome, which the long process of evolution has shaped (or grounded) through the interaction
between organism and environment, but this solution is not available to designed, artiﬁcial systems.
Symbolic AI has historically faced a host of problems when situated in real world environments. This
has led some to parody the symbolic approach as ‘good old-fashioned AI’ or GOFAI (Haugeland, 1985). As
a result, certain researchers—notably Brooks (1990, 1991a, 1999)—seek to discard the symbolic notions of
the mind entirely. This is typically termed ‘embodied AI’. Workers in this paradigm build systems that act
upon the world through cycles of perception and action based on some adaptive connectionist or statistical
machine learning principles. A question remains as to whether these connectionist models truly discard
symbolic representations or simply obscure them. Aside from this, embodied AI still faces a number of
challenges when modelling higher cognitive functions such as language and abstract reasoning.
Having very brieﬂy reviewed the major schism of symbolic versus non-symbolic approaches to AI, we
now move to a slightly more detailed treatment of the three philosophical standpoints identiﬁed earlier.
2.1 Symbol grounding
Symbol grounding holds that meaning can be found in a symbolic system, so long as the symbols are
derived from the classiﬁcation of the system’s experiences. These experiences come from the environment,
through sensor readings, and so have meaning intrinsic to the system, rather than just being ‘parasitic’. It is
then possible to take these symbols, grounded in the environment, and manipulate them, thereby deriving
new meanings (Cangelosi et al., 2000). Meaning then ﬂows from initial experiences up to higher-order
symbolic manipulation.
Symbol manipulation is usually carried out through the planning paradigm. The main features ofJune 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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planning can be characterised by a distinction between the perception, the action, and the reasoning
functions of the agent. Signiﬁcantly, the agent’s reasoning involves the manipulation of an explicit world
model. Symbol grounding attempts to answer the question: How do we give this world model meaning?
2.2 Symbol attachment
The symbol grounding approach is underpinned by the assumption that meaning could only be derived from
experience. To some this heralded the rebirth of concept empiricism as put forward by Locke (1690/1979),
who held that at birth the mind was a ‘tabula rasa’. According to Aaron Sloman (personal communication),
concept empiricism ‘was refuted long ago by the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1781)’, who argued that
one cannot have experiences unless one already has concepts. If the content of mind does not have any
initial meaning, further meanings cannot be derived. Therefore, our experiences cannot be the sole source
of knowledge. Some basic concepts cannot come directly from the environment and so symbol grounding,
in its strictest sense, must be ﬂawed.
Symbol attachment brings Kant’s refutation of concept empiricism into the ﬁeld of AI. Like symbol
grounding, it considers the structure of concepts to be essential to the nature of meaning, but these
meanings do not have to come from the experience of the environment. Rather, sensory experience can
be used to reduce residual indeterminacy. However, the meanings themselves are not only derived from
the environment but also from an initial innate source. As the agent experiences the world, this innate
knowledge becomes grounded. An instinctive, abstract concept becomes relevant through interaction with
the environment.
Some researchers (MacDorman, 1997; Nenov, 1991; Klinspor et al., 1996), in attempting to implement
a symbol-grounding-based system, have unintentionally illustrated this problem with strict symbol
grounding. When taking the planning approach, it is always the case that certain concepts (usually space,
time and cause and eﬀect) need to be ‘designed in’ by the programmer. Symbol attachment wholeheartedly
accepts the need for this designed element but still leaves us with a number of problems.
If we are to accept the existence of genetically-encoded concepts, the only possible source of innateJune 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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knowledge, how is this to be represented in an AI system and where does it leave our concept of meaning?
We could simply return to the meaningless design of various concepts for our agent, citing an abstract
genetic ‘learning’ as our justiﬁcation. However, we need to consider that this genetic encoding was a
product of the environment. So rather than obtaining meaning by direct sensory experience, grounding is
provided through evolutionary selection pressures. The animal as a whole, genome and all, is grounded
in the environment. By comparison, simply designing a set of concepts into an artiﬁcial system leaves us
open to Harnard’s old objection; speciﬁcally the ‘meaning’ in the system is simply parasitic, being more
relevant to the designer then the system. This is the artiﬁcial equivalent of psychology’s bete noir, the
homunculus, described by Lloyd (1989, p.205) as ‘the primary method of passing the buck with respect
to genuine explanation’.
2.3 Enactivism
Others seek to avoid the question of meaning by eliminating any symbolic planning within the system,
e.g. Brooks (1990, 1991a, 1999). In particular, Brooks (1991b) favoured a subsumption architecture in
which diﬀerent layers of control behave reactively to the environment. These reactive layers of control
are arranged on top of each other, with the actions of the higher layers taking priority over the lower
layers, whereas the information from the lower layers feeds upwards to the higher layers. By comparison,
a planning system uses a complex world model, in combination with a detailed learning algorithm, to
produce intelligent behaviour. Planning typically produces complex systems, since any failure at the task
is generally taken to reﬂect shortcomings of the model, which is then made more complex to cope.
2.4 Space of Cognitive Abilities
A key aspect of this work is that we devise a space—actually three-dimensional—in which we can position
the agent according to its ‘adjustable’ cognitive abilities, and study its success at some relevant task. This
space is depicted in Figure 1. The three dimensions are:
(i) The size of the agent’s symbol memory. (In this work, this ranges from 0 to 100 symbols.)June 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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Figure 1. In this work, the agent’s cognitive abilities are deﬁned by its placement in a 3-D space, having a direct mapping to the
philosophical standpoints of symbol grounding, symbol attachment and enactivism.
(ii) The percentage of symbols in this memory that are innate (i.e. not acquired through experience).
(iii) The extent to which the agent attempts to predict the future behaviour of the environment, quantiﬁed
as planning depth (in time steps).
The space is devised to portray points and regions that reﬂect degrees of commitment to the three
opposing philosophical standpoints of symbol grounding, symbol attachment, and enactivism. As depicted
in Fig. 1, the pure symbol grounding approach to AI maps to the plane at which the percentage of innate
symbols is zero, the pure symbol attachment approach maps to the plane at which the percentage of innate
symbols is 100%, and pure enactivism maps to the origin of coordinates, at which there are no symbolic
abilities at all. The reader is warned that the design of this space is such that its three dimensions do not
correspond exactly to the three philosophical standpoints of concern, and should not be confused.
Sloman and Chappell (2004) detail the biological plausibility of the grounding-to-attachment continuum
(the z-axis of Fig. 1), by identifying a spectrum of animals ranging from the altricial to the precocial.
A precocial bird will be able to function within a few days of birth. It has been born with all of the innate
knowledge it needs to survive in its environment. By comparison, an altricial bird is dependent on its
parents for survival; it needs time to develop and acquire its concepts of the world through experience.June 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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3 Design methodology
The agent—with cognitive abilities deﬁned by its coordinates in the space of Fig. 1—is placed in an
environment in which it interacts with a two-dimensional cellular automaton. In this system, α the alive
cell threshold, and, β the dead cell threshold, can be adjusted within the range 0–8 allowing for a variety
of cellular automata to be used. For example, by setting α = 3 and β = 2, Conway’s ‘game of life’ is
implemented. The agent is placed at a random location within the environment; its overall task is to
maintain a proportion of cells, speciﬁed by the designer, in the entire environment, in the alive state.
There are two sub-tasks: either to increase the alive-cell density from an initial to a higher value, or to
decrease the alive-cell density from an initial to a lower value.
3.1 Agent abilities
To perform its task of maintaining a target proportion of alive cells, the agent has a number of abilities:
perceptual, action and cognitive. The perceptual and action abilities are ﬁxed. The cognitive abilities are
variable, and correspond to parameter settings that position the agent at some appropriate point in the
3-D space of Figure 1, so enabling us to compare experimentally the various philosophical approaches to AI
embodied in this ﬁgure.
The agent moves through and alters the environment by its actions. It can move one cell in any direction
(i.e. 8-neighbourhood). When a cell is within a radius of two cells from the agent (i.e. 24-neighbourhood),
it is able to ‘ﬂip’ the state of the cell. Potentially, it can ﬂip all 24 cells in a single time step, but only every
four time steps—this being the number of steps required to arrive in a totally new local environment.
There are basically three perceptual abilities: the agent can look ahead in a 180◦ arc, split into 20 equal
sections, and can sense the proportion of alive cells within each section. The radius of this arc is set at
20 cells. It can sense the proportion of alive cells in the environment as a whole, enabling it to compare
this number to the target proportion. The agent is also able to perceive the density of the surrounding
24 cells from its current location, and at the last location at which it performed an action, enabling it to
assess the consequences of its actions.June 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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3.2 Pure symbol grounding agent
A symbolic agent is one that manipulates a (symbolic) model of its environment, enabling it to explore
hypothetical scenarios and theorise about how the world will behave in the future. It needs to experiment
with possible approaches and learn the consequences of its actions, making it capable of planning its
actions instead of simply reacting. In the case of pure symbol grounding, the agent needs to construct its
world model through experience of the environment; for the symbols to have meaning, they need to be
grounded in the world.
Taking the abilities detailed in Section 3.1 above, we add planning and learning. At each time step,
the agent records the current perceived state of the world using its vision arc, and measures the density
change from the previous time step. Thus, it acquires a set of symbols, one for each section of its vision arc,
recording how densities in the environment have changed over time. These symbols are arranged in the
agent’s memory (world model) to provide it with a record of how neighbouring densities alter the density
under consideration.
This learning process is deﬁned by Algorithm 1. Once the world model has been constructed over a
minimum of two time steps, it can be used to explore possibilities about the world. Before deciding upon a
course of action, the agent will predict the densities of the area within its vision arc for a number of time
steps into the future (i.e. the planning depth).
The planning process is deﬁned by Algorithm 2, by which the agent predicts how the density of the
surrounding environment will change over time. To enable the symbolic information to be generalised to
novel situations, the recorded density changes are rounded to three decimal places (i.e. numerical precision
of p = 3). Accordingly, similar local environments will be treated in a similar way. The agent acts on this
information to alter its environment.
Having made a prediction, the agent selects a heading and an action as deﬁned by Algorithms 3 and 4. It
does this by considering how previous heading decisions and actions have aﬀected the world. The selected
heading/action will be those that cause the greatest predicted density change towards the desired goal. If
it has not encountered the surrounding 24 cell density before, it will select a random action and observeJune 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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Algorithm 1 Learning process for the symbol grounding agent.
loop
S[] ← density values
P[] ← placed cell pattern
for all i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ S[].length do
CS[] ← S[i](t) + S[i](t − 1)
end for
for all j such that 0 ≤ j ≤ CS[].length do
densityL ← CS[j − 1]
densityR ← CS[j + 1]
if densityL ≥ CS[j] and densityR ≥ CS[j] then
I[] ← CS[j] + P[j]
end if
if densityL ≤ CS[j] and densityR ≤ CS[j] then
D[] ← CS[j] + P[j]
end if
if densityL ≥ CS[j] and densityR ≤ CS[j] then
IL[] ← CS[j] + P[j]
end if
if densityL ≤ CS[j] and densityR ≥ CS[j] then
IR[] ← CS[j] + P[j]
end if
end for
EnvInc ← I
EnvDec ← D
LefInc ← IL
RigInc ← IR
end loop
Algorithm 2 Planning process for the symbol grounding agent.
PW ← perceived world
for j such that 0 ≤ j ≤ prediction depth do
for i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ P.density do
GP ←generalise(P[i])
if GP[i] ≡ one of {I[],D[],IL[],IR[]} then
PW(t + 1) ← PW+ matched {I[],D[],IL[],IR[]}
PW(t + 1) ← PW(t + 1)+ matched {EnvInc,EnvDec,LefInc,RigInc}
PW ← PW(t + 1)
t ← t + 1
end if
end for
end for
how this aﬀects the local density after four time steps. Similarly, if the agent has not encountered the
observed density arc before (i.e. 180◦ arc of 20-cell radius), it will pick a random heading and observe how
this, combined with the selected action, has aﬀected the global density. As a result, it can learn throughJune 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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Algorithm 3 Heading selection process for the symbol grounding agent.
if PW = one of I[],D[],IL[],IR[] then
H ← H from I[],D[],IL[],IR[]
if H > 1 then
H ← H from, sort(I[],D[],IL[],IR[], greatest desired density change)
end if
else
H ← random
Execute H
end if
Algorithm 4 Action selection process for the symbol grounding agent.
LW ← surrounding 24 cells
if LW = one of I[],D[],IL[],IR[] then
P ← P from I[],D[],IL[],IR[]
if P > 1 then
P ← P from, sort(I[],D[],IL[],IR[], greatest desired density change)
end if
else
P ← random
Execute P
end if
its experience and construction of a generalised world model.
The world model is deﬁned by a number of density-change symbols, sometimes linked with action
patterns or headings, which the agent can store in its memory. This number is set by the researcher and
can range from 0 to 100. When the symbol limit is reached, the oldest symbol is deleted to allow each new
symbol to be added.
3.3 Pure symbol attachment agent
An agent making use of symbol attachment can use innate concepts given to it at birth. To do this, an
agent will either have a hand-coded world model or it will be trained in one environment and then re-born
in another. The concepts acquired through experience in one life will then become innate in the next. As
the agent experiences the new environment, these innate concepts become attached to the environment as
they are experienced anew, or they remain ungrounded if they are never experienced. The pure symbol
attachment agent and the pure symbol grounding agent are distinguished only by the former’s possessionJune 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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of an established set of concepts at birth; all other abilities are equal.
3.4 Pure enactivist agent
The enactivist agent is implemented by linking its perception reactively to its actions. Its perception of
the proportion of alive cells is linked to its choice to ﬂip neighbouring cells. If it perceives that there are
more alive cells than required, it will ﬂip the neighbouring cells to the dead state. Conversely, if there are
not enough alive cells, the agent will ﬂip the neighbouring cells to the alive state.
The vision arc is then used to determine the agent’s movement. If the agent has to reduce the number of
alive cells, it will move towards the highest density of cells. Alternatively, if it has to increase the number
of alive cells, it will move towards the lowest density of cells. If it cannot make a heading decision, it will
pick a random direction, as no more sensible course of action is available.
3.5 Parameter adjustment
A few relevant parameters can be used to deﬁne a position in the space spanning these three
approaches (Fig. 1). We have already speciﬁed how re-birth can create an attachment agent, but there
is a continuum between attachment and grounding. The proportion of innate symbols determines the
agent’s location on this continuum—the z-axis of Fig 1. If there is no room in the memory for additional
symbols to be formed through experience, then the agent is entirely precocial; it makes plans based on its
innate concepts. However, if there is available memory, then it is capable of learning more about the world
through experience.
Additionally, an increase in the planning depth allows us to move away from a pure enactivist agent. The
more an agent can plan ahead, the less it is simply reacting to the current environment. The ‘environment
as its own model’ (Brooks, 1991b) is increasingly replaced by a plan deﬁned by the agent’s internal model.June 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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Figure 2. Positioning of pure symbol grounding agent, pure symbol attachment agent and pure attachment agent in the 3D-space of
cognitive architectures. The thick solid lines denote the parameter variations employed to explore the space.
4 Experimental design and results
Clearly, the space of Fig. 1 is very large and it is not feasible to explore it fully. All we can hope is to
look at a reasonable number of points (corresponding to speciﬁc agent cognitive architectures/abilities)
within it. The experimental design aims at giving reasonable coverage, allowing us to draw valid and
useful conclusions.
Since Fig. 1 has three axes, we have evaluated the impact of each: planning depth (x-axis), size of symbol
memory (y-axis) and percentage of innate symbols in this memory (z-axis). When assessing any one of
these, the other dimensions are held constant. The default parameters for each philosophical standpoint are
depicted in Figure 2, along with thick lines to denote the parameter variations around (two of) the defaults.
For the symbol attachment agent, it is necessary to have a mechanism for supplying innate symbols.
This was done by placing a symbol grounding agent in an environment and running a simulation until its
symbolic memory was full. It was then re-born in a new environment where it was assessed. The initial
environment had the same settings as the environment in which it was reborn.
Three cellular automata were used as environments, as depicted in Table 1. In all three environments,
the agent had to adjust the alive-cell density according to the initial parameters shown in Table 2, for the
two sub-tasks mentioned previously. Each cellular automaton was run for 500 time steps, which was foundJune 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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Table 1. Speciﬁcation of the three cellular au-
tomata used in this work, denoted Complex, Stable
and Exploding.
α β Name Type
{2,3} {2} Conway’s Life Complex
{5} {3,4,6} Long Life Stable
{3,4} {3,4} 34 Life Exploding
Table 2. The agent is set one of two sub-tasks, either to
increase or to decrease the density of alive cells.
Sub-task Initial density (%) Desired density (%)
Increase 20 35
Decrease 20 5
to be suﬃcient for the agent to have a noticeable eﬀect on its environment. The size of the environment was
35 × 35 cells. This is a reasonable compromise, being large enough to present the agent with a challenge
yet still allowing it to have an eﬀective inﬂuence on it.
4.1 Comparison of the pure agent architectures
These are compared with respect to deviation between actual and desired density of alive cells as a
function of time. Fig. 3 shows the performance of the enactivist and symbol grounding architectures across
the 500 time steps. Each point depicted is for an average over 5 repetitions from a diﬀerent random starting
point of the 2 sub-tasks and 3 environments.
As expected in view of its ﬁxed, reactive architecture, the performance of the enactivist approach
remains unchanged apart from (quite large) statistical variation caused by the uncertain (as far as the
agent is concerned) changes in environment. Initially, the symbol grounding approach is more or less
indistinguishable from the enactivist approach, since few or no symbols have been acquired. Over time,
the symbol grounding approach undergoes a learning phase in which it is acquiring symbols and its
performance is relatively poor. At time step 50, its symbolic memory is full and old symbols may be
discarded for new ones. On the basis of a t-test of means, symbol grounding is poorer than enactivism over
the period of 50 to 225 time steps (marginally signiﬁcant P = 0.07). Thereafter, as the symbol memory
starts to stabilise, performance improves and becomes competitive with the enactivist architecture. (The
pattern of performance was largely unchanged for time steps great than 500.)June 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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Figure 3. Performance of enactivist architecture and symbol grounding architecture over time.
Figure 4. Performance of symbol attachment architecture and symbol grounding architecture versus time.
Fig. 4 shows the performance of the symbol attachment and symbol grounding architectures across the
500 time steps. Again, each point depicted is for an average over 5 repetitions of the 2 sub-tasks and
3 environments. At face value, and given the eﬀect of the uncertain (as far as the agent is concerned)
environmental changes, it is hard to say that there is much systematic diﬀerence between these two. We
do, of course, expect greater variability in the performance of the symbol grounding architecture simply
because it is a learning system; its world model is subject to constant change. Although symbol attachment
might speed the learning process, the innate concepts need to be relevant to the actions and performance
of the agent.June 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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In summary, there is little to choose between the two pure symbolic architectures (Fig. 4). The
attachment architecture performs generally better in the short term (Fig. 3), since it does not have to learn,
and learning can be an error-prone process. However, after successful learning, a symbolic architecture can
do just as well. A well-designed purely reactive system uses the world as its own model and can behave
appropriately as a result. It may have a prediction depth of zero, but by the same token, there will be
zero error in its world model (since it doesn’t have one). In this work, the environment stops while the
agent builds its world model; this does not happen in the real world! Previous work, e.g. Shakey the robot
(Nilsson, 1984), has shown that the time taken to construct a world model is a crucial problem when a
real-world robot is constructed. While the agent is building its representation, the world itself carries on,
making any plan built for a static environment potentially irrelevant. This gives an edge to the enactivist
agent when compared to the symbol grounding agent.
4.2 Variation of planning depth
Here, we test the agent’s performance as a function of planning depth by varying its position along Line 1
in Fig. 2 from depth 0 to 20, in increments of 5. Note that when planning depth equals 0, we have a pure
enactivist agent—symbol memory size is irrelevant if there is no symbolic planning.
Figure 5 shows the deviation from the desired density. Each point depicted is for a particular time step
(of the 500) averaged over 5 repetitions of the 2 sub-tasks and 3 environments. It seems that there is a
disadvantage to having planning capability, or at least, the agent is unable to exploit it to build an accurate
world model.
Why is the model inaccurate? Is it a result of poor generalisation? To answer these question, the diﬀerence
between the agent’s world model and the actual world was computed, averaged over both sub-tasks, the
3 environments, 500 time steps and 5 repetitions, as a function of planning depth and level of generalisation
(i.e. the degree of numerical rounding, or precision, p). The result is shown in Figure 6. At this point,
we should emphasise the (subtle) diﬀerence between the y-axes of Figs. 5 and 6. The y-axis of Fig. 5
(divergence from desired density) indicates how far the agent is from achieving its goal, i.e. it is a measureJune 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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Figure 5. Average performance diﬀerence between actual and desired alive cell density as a function of planning depth, for the default
value of precision parameter, p = 3.
Figure 6. World model accuracy for diﬀerent levels of planning depth and numerical precision, p. Note that p is an inverse measure of
the agent’s level of generalisation.
of ‘performance’. However, the y-axis of Fig. 6 (divergence of agent’s model from actual world) indicates
how far the agent’s internal world model is from the actual world.
The curve in Fig. 6 for the higher levels of generalisation (p ∼ 3) is very similar in shape to that of Fig. 5,
indicating that the deterioration in performance as planning depth increases is most likely due to a failure
of the world model when generalisation is too severe. This error aﬀects the agent’s predictions causing it
to make the wrong heading decisions and action choices; it can be countered by relaxing the degree of
generalisation, i.e. increasing the numerical precision by increasing p. The divergence of the agent’s model
from the actual world then falls to zero, irrespective of planning depth, for p ≥ 6. The question arising isJune 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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Figure 7. Diﬀerence in performance over diﬀerent planning depths when the numerical precision is 1 and 9.
how this reduced generalisation capability would be reﬂected in agent performance.
As can been seen in Figure 7, when the precision parameter is set to p = 1, the performance improves as
the planning depth increases. This suggests that a reasonably high level of generalisation makes the world
model useful, in spite of its divergence from the actual world, as one would expect intuitively (by avoidance
of over-ﬁtting to speciﬁc cases). By comparison, when the symbols have high levels of precision, p = 9, the
performance appears to decrease with planning depth, probably because the precise world model scenarios
are used only very few times (i.e. there is over-ﬁtting). As a result the agent is forced to choose a new
random action and heading at each time step.
4.3 Variation of symbol memory capacity
By varying the parameters along Line 2 of Fig. 2, we investigated the role of the size of the agent’s symbolic
memory. As seen in Figure 8, the memory size has no discernible eﬀect on performance.
4.4 Variation of proportion of innate concepts
We assessed a range of conﬁgurations, from grounding to attachment, by varying the proportion of innate
concepts along Line 3 of Fig. 2. The cognitive architecture of the agent was initially set to pure symbol
grounding with its memory capacity set to 100 symbols. Further conﬁgurations were tested by increasingJune 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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Figure 8. World model accuracy for diﬀerent levels of planning depth and generalisation.
the proportion of innate concepts in the memory from 0 to 100 in increments of 20 symbols. The average
deviation from the desired density was recorded for all combinations of the 2 sub-tasks and 3 environments,
and for 5 repetitions. In addition, the deviation in prediction accuracy (between the world model and the
cellular automaton) was recorded and averaged.
Figure 9 shows the deviation from desired cell density (i.e. performance) for these diﬀerent conﬁgurations
as a function of time. There is a slight decrease in performance as proportion of attached symbols increases,
and performance is more or less constant over time. Figure 10 shows divergence between the agent’s world
model and the actual world for the same situation as depicted in Fig. 9. The results indicate a possible
problem with the inﬂexibility of innate concepts, in that accuracy decreases with increased proportion of
attached symbols and also over time, although there is no impact on the performance (Fig. 9). This occurs
even when the symbol attachment agent has been trained in a similar environment to the test environment,
and may be a result of changes in the initial conﬁguration of the two environments: concepts acquired in
one do not necessarily apply in the other. This further illustrates the dangers of using inﬂexible innate
concepts even if they appear to be correct.
It is noteworthy that here the deterioration in model accuracy was not reﬂected in depressed performance
whereas in Section 4.2 it was. The simplest interpretation of this ﬁnding is that it is the interplay of planning
depth and proportion of attached symbols that is the cause of deterioration.June 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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Figure 9. The world model deviation from the environment on the altricial-precocial scale.
Figure 10. The world model deviation from the environment on the altricial-precocial scale.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have attempted to show how empirical or experimental research might oﬀer at least some
insight into foundational, philosophical questions underpinning artiﬁcial intelligence (AI). Of course, the
ﬁndings here are highly speciﬁc to the situation studied, and it would be foolhardy to suggest that they
had general validity for all ﬁelds of AI. Rather, our main claim is that an empirical exploration of the
space of possibilities, in the way that we have done, could usefully form the initial phase of the design of
many practical AI systems. It forms a valuable alternative to the AI technician simply declaring a priori
adherence to a particular philosophical position, as tends to happen at present. This a priori allegiance to
a school of thought anyway carries the danger of ending up being compromised by the practical necessity
of making a system work.June 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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With this important caveat, and given that we must always be careful when drawing general conclusions
from designed models, what insights have we gleaned and how portable are they between applications?
Clearly, both our agent and its artiﬁcial environment were highly simpliﬁed, to keep the work focused and
tractable; hence, we readily concede that portability is low. However, as we scale up complexity, we believe
that the sort of issues identiﬁed here will only become more acute.
Speciﬁcally, we have found the following. In some circumstances, a purely reactive (enactivist) system
may not only be suﬃcient, but can have concrete advantages. These stem from the avoidance of having
to acquire a world model that has the right level of generalisation, tracks changes in the environment
on an appropriate time scale, etc. Well-known problems such as the bias-variance, stability-plasticity and
exploration-exploitation dilemmas raise their head here. Of course, the reactive system has to be properly
designed in the ﬁrst place, and herein lies a real problem when the application confronts a signiﬁcant degree
of complexity. Although symbolic planning oﬀers a solution in this case, the complexity of the world model
and the algorithm for acquiring it need to be matched to the complexity of the environment and of the
task, as explored here through the symbolic memory size.
Although obviously simpliﬁed, we argue that the environment devised for this work has many positive
aspects; it is dynamic and has a useful degree of complexity, providing a valid challenge for the agent. But
this dynamic nature places a limit on the signiﬁcance of the results as the density changes eﬀected by the
agent are often dwarfed by the density changes of the environment. By averaging the results over 3 cellular
automata, 2 sub-tasks and multiple runs, we limit the eﬀect of the environments’ own interactions and
expose the agent’s achievements.
With the empirical framework outlined here, researchers can begin to deﬁne, test, and justify their own
approaches. It might even lead to a reappraisal of apparently competing philosophies, and perhaps to their
extension and/or reconciliation. This is important because otherwise we are left with verbal theories based
loosely on the mind-as-machine metaphor. These verbal theories can suﬀer from a lack of precision and
hidden assumptions. Ultimately, let the success of AI be judged by its results and not its philosophy.June 18, 2007 10:58 Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artiﬁcial Intelligence paper
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